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Introduction  
The decentralisation of collective bargaining has been a major trend in many 
developed economies over recent decades. The institutional frameworks and 
legislative contexts may differ but the downward shift in agreement-making increases 
the pressure on the relationship between unions and employers to negotiate 
productive and mutually beneficial outcomes. Successful decentralisation implies that 
managements and unions establish and maintain stable working relationships. 
However, seemingly durable and productive relationships can deteriorate, even 
collapse while difficult relationships can be constructively reformed. Our 
understanding of these dynamics and the role of negotiation within them is 
incomplete and so this paper seeks to explore the factors that shape the trajectory of 
decentralized bargaining arrangements in practice, through a comparison of local 
union-management negotiations in Australia and Denmark.  
Our theoretical departure point is Walton et al.’s (1994) work on strategic union-
management negotiation processes. In particular, we draw upon the findings of 
research into the negotiation process to build on their ideas about the interactions 
and outcomes of negotiations to posit that collective bargaining relationships can be 
classified along a spectrum from fragility to stability. Our aim is to elaborate factors 
that explain differences in the dynamics and outcomes of decentralized union-
management negotiations.  
Our analysis is empirically grounded in case studies of local union-management 
negotiations in Australia and Denmark. In Australia, the shift to decentralized 
bargaining occurred in the 1980s and is conducted in a highly regulated environment. 
By contrast, decentralized bargaining in Denmark is more recent and is far more 
 3 
voluntarist. At the same time, we sought to control for other variables by matching 
our cases at the industry level. We conducted two in-depth case studies of local 
union-management negotiations in closely matched Danish and Australian 
manufacturing firms.  
We identify a number of negotiation factors that impact upon the durability of 
decentralized bargaining relationships at local level: goal alignment; the distribution 
of power between the parties; and the interpersonal dynamics (including trust and 
information exchange). However, the voluntarist regulatory frame work in Denmark 
appears to leave local negotiators with a larger room for manoeuvre to develop these 
factors compared to the legalistic regulatory frame work in Australia. Our findings 
have implications for both bargaining practice and public policy. In practical terms, 
the stability / fragility of bargaining relationships is likely to influence the viability of 
mutual gains bargaining and, more generally, the pursuit of union-management 
‘partnerships’. At the public policy level, our findings suggest that differences 
between the institutional settings of national industrial relations systems may tend to 
push company-level bargaining towards either fragility or stability.  
 
Background 
Workplace bargaining in Australia  
The management of workplace relations in Australia has been dominated by the 
prominent role given at the outset (in 1904) to formal arbitration as the primary 
means for resolving industrial disputes (FWC, 2011; Hancock, 1985). The system 
developed into a complex structure of enforceable industry and occupational awards 
that specified, in some detail, the employment conditions in a particular industry or for 
an occupational group. Unionisation was over 50%. The system was centralised in 
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that key decisions on specific issues, such as the standard working week, would be 
decided in a ‘test case’ often involving the Metal Trades industry and then ‘flow on’ to 
other occupations and industry sectors. Collective bargaining over wages and 
conditions was a secondary process during this period (Gahan and Pekarek, 2012).  
The 1980s saw a major change as part of a broader package of economic 
reforms to improve Australia’s international competitiveness (Woden, 2000). The 
focus shifted to direct management-union negotiations at the enterprise level but the 
content of these enterprise agreements was still subject to approval by the tribunal to 
ensure that minimum standards were being maintained. A safety net is maintained 
through around 120 basic industry or occupational awards, the parties then building 
upon the appropriate one when negotiating their enterprise agreements (see Bray et 
al 2005 ch 8 for a more detailed description). Enterprise agreements are normally for 
two or three years (the maximum terms is 4 years) with specified wage improvements 
during the term of the agreement. The negotiation process is typically driven by a 
union official, supported by local delegates. Enterprise bargaining is now the primary 
mechanism for settling wages and conditions (ABS, 2014a). 
Another important feature of the Australian system has been the frequency of 
legislative change, particularly since 1996. Public policy, reflected in new legislation 
with each change of government, has shifted between giving primacy to collective 
bargaining or to employment arrangements individually negotiated between employer 
and employee. The conduct of enterprise bargaining is highly regulated, imposing 
both procedural (e.g. good faith bargaining, right to strike) and substantive (e.g. 
agreement content restricted, some content mandatory) requirements on the parties. 
Unions don’t enjoy exclusive bargaining rights, so that companies can make 
agreements directly with employees, individually or collectively but without union 
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involvement. There has been a concurrent decline in unionisation with just 17% of 
employees being union members (ABS, 2014b). 
The Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union is the main union representing 
manufacturing workers and has over 100,00 members). There is an underpinning 
industry award (Manufacturing and Associated Industries and Occupations Award, 
2010) and the Fair Work Commission lists 780 enterprise agreements that relate 
specifically to the manufacturing industry. 
 
Workplace bargaining in Denmark  
The Danish labour market is mainly regulated via collective agreements negotiated 
between unions and employers´ organizations; legislation plays a very role on labour 
market issues. Decentralization of collective bargaining in Denmark has been a 
process of organized decentralization, where bargaining competencies have been 
delegated to the workplace level within the frame work of sector-level agreements 
and without significant drops in union densities (Traxler 1995). Today, union density 
in Denmark is close to a level where seven in 10 wage earners are organized, and 
seven in ten are covered by collective agreements (Due et al. 2010).  
Manufacturing is the trend-setting sector with regards to decentralization and 
has the longest history of decentralization within the Danish collective bargaining 
system (Due et al. 1994; Jensen 2007). As early as 1902, pay became a matter of 
company-level bargaining within the metal industry, and over the past century, this 
tradition of local wage setting spread to the rest of Danish manufacturing. At present, 
only minimum wage levels (which make up approximately half of the wages paid) are 
negotiated at sector level in manufacturing, whereas the actual wage increases are 
concluded between local bargaining parties. During the 1990s, possibilities for 
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company-level bargaining were expanded to include working hours, and from 2000, 
the local agenda could be further expanded, provided that there is local consent 
(Navrbjerg et al. 2001). Currently, more than eight in ten companies covered by the 
Industrial Agreement in manufacturing have negotiated company level agreements 
on both wages and working hours (Ilsøe 2012). 
However, it is important to underline that this decentralization process from the 
very beginning took place within the framework of the general sector-level 
agreement, which secures each local bargaining party the right to terminate any local 
agreement with two months’ notice and fall back on the regulations of the sector-level 
agreement (Industrial Agreement 2014: chapter II). This de facto right of veto has 
been an important precondition for unions when accepting the delegation of 
bargaining competencies from the sector level to the company level. Furthermore, 
the Danish system of shop stewards has been an important precondition. Danish 
shop stewards (tillidsrepræsentanter) are elected among union members at the 
workplace and usually possess extensive bargaining experience; it is they, not union 
officials who conduct the negotiations at the company level. Surveys among 
manufacturing companies covered by the Industrial Agreement indicate that more 
than seven in ten companies have at least one shop steward present (Ilsøe 2012). 
Three out of four managers and three out of four shop stewards in companies with 
shop stewards present reported high levels of trust in relation to the other bargaining 
party (Ilsøe, 2012) which means that many managers and shop stewards in Danish 
manufacturing has the potential to develop bargaining relations with a partnership 
character.   
 
 
 7 
Negotiations in the workplace context 
Negotiating strategically for collaborative outcomes 
The nature of management –union relations has long been a matter of academic 
interest as well as practical concern. In their seminal work Walton and McKersie 
(1965) recognised that these relationships could range fromconflict to collusion. In 
the UK, similar patterns of relationships were being identified(for example, Purcell, 
1981), reflecting a growing public policy concern about workplace relations and its 
contribution to economic prosperity. Walton and McKersie recognised that the nature 
of a management-union relationship would be a factor influencing how the parties 
then negotiated their agreements. This more dynamic consideration was developed 
in their later work (Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld & McKersie, 1994) which analysed a 
number of workplace case studies to develop a framework for analysing the strategic 
dynamics of negotiations in the workplace context. The framework recognised that 
managements could force a change in the social contract (the term they use to cover 
management-union and employer-employee relationships), they could foster a 
change, or attempt to escape from a management-union relationship altogether 
(Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld & McKersie, 1994, p.58).  
The research and theory development by Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld and 
McKersie is still relevant because it was conducted in the context of managements 
seeking to reshape workplace relations in the face of competitive pressures. It is 
these same competitive pressures that have been the context for policies that focus 
on developing collective bargaining at the workplace rather than industry or national 
levels. However, the focus of their analysis was strategic change whereas to be 
successful the practice of workplace bargaining requires stability of relationships (as 
well as generating mutually beneficial outcomes). To this end, focus has shifted to 
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how this might be achieved, with the development of mutual gains (more recently 
termed interest-based) bargaining, primarily in the US (Cohen-Rosenthal & Burton, 
1993; Kochan & Osterman, 1994) and the notion of partnership in the UK (Kelly, 
2004; Martinez-Lucio & Stewart, 2004). Both developments were similar in their 
realisation that collaborative and constructive bargaining in an enterprise can 
normally only occur in the context of a broader commitment to mutuality between 
management and union. In this respect the mutual gains enterprise and the 
partnership model are both building on the strategic negotiation framework. However 
the evidence in support of sustained genuine mutual gain or partnership is patchy 
(see Fells and Prowse, 2013, for a review) suggesting the need for further analysis of 
the dynamics of negotiation in the workplace context for factors that might contribute 
to (or undermine) the stability of workplace bargaining structures and processes. 
 
Competitive or collaborative negotiation? 
Each negotiation is different and case studies of workplace negotiations attest to their 
complexity (see, for example, Bacon & Blyton, 2006, Cutcher Gershenfeld, 2011; 
Fells, 2000). The strategic negotiation framework identifies that negotiation involves 
three separate processes. The parties will bargain with each other, either 
competitively or cooperatively. Second, each side may take actions to build a 
particular type of relationship with the other party (‘shaping intergroup attitudes’)  – 
the development of a mutual gains or partnership approach, referred to above, would 
be examples of this. The third process occurs within each side as the negotiators 
manage the differences of opinion within their respective constituencies (‘managing 
internal differences’).  
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Whether a negotiation is competitive or cooperative depends upon a wide range 
of factors but research into negotiation (which is extensive) suggests that four are 
significant – the goal alignment, the extent of information exchange, the level of trust 
and the exercise of power. 
Walton and McKersie (1965) recognised that if the parties enter a negotiation 
thinking they have a range of issues to resolve they are likely to negotiate more 
competitively than if they approach the negotiation with an agenda of problems to 
solve. Most negotiators perceive approach their negotiations expecting them to be 
zero sum and so strategize accordingly (Bazerman & Neale, 1992). The 
competitiveness associated with this win-lose expectation is typically reinforced when 
there are constituencies, as in the case of management-union negotiations 
(Friedman, 1994; Klimoski, 1972). In contrast, where negotiators have concern for 
the other party’s outcome then they are more likely to adopt a collaborative approach 
(Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; De Dreu, Weingart and Kwon, 2000). For this reason 
models of mutual gains/interest-based bargaining and of partnership both emphasise 
the need for management and union to have a common understanding of the 
negotiation’s context so as to encourage mutuality in goal setting. 
The second factor that will influence the level of competitiveness or cooperation 
in the negotiation is the extent to which the parties exchange information (Thompson, 
1991). A reluctance to share information or a willingness o use it to undermine the 
other party both develop a competitive dynamic whereas sharing information, 
particularly one’s core interests and priorities, increases the likelihood of finding value 
adding solutions.  
The third factor is the level of trust between the negotiators (Butler, 1999; 
Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000). When the consequences of not trusting seem risky then 
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trust can be calculative; alternatively trust can be built though an identification of 
common interests or goals (Lewicki & Stevenson, 1997) leading to the negotiators 
being open to mutual rather than to only self-serving solutions (Olekalns, Lau & 
Smith, 2007). The trust dimension is one aspect of negotiation that can have its roots 
in the broader attitudes the parties hold towards each other. Where, over time, the 
parties have taken time to interact and understand each other, there is likely to be a 
greater level of trust when they sit down to negotiate than in situations where there 
hasn’t been this prior interaction.  
The final key factor that shapes the conduct of a negotiation is the way the 
parties assess and exercise power. Negotiating power has to do with alternatives – 
how else might a negotiating party achieve its goal if agreement cannot be reached 
with the party across the table? (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Fisher, Ury & Patton, 
1991). In the industrial relations context the alternatives to bargaining are the strike 
or lockout. This bargaining power derives from the ability to impose economic costs 
(Chamberlain and Kuhn, 1965) and for this reason national industrial relations 
systems have been established to create, and in come cases, mandate the 
alternative processes of mediation and arbitration rather than industrial action. Even 
when such institutional processes exist the exercise of power still occurs at the 
bargaining table. The parties’ perceptions of the strength of their position is often 
based on their assessment of the prevailing economic context; a tight labour market 
will encourage the union and its members to press for a higher wage increase. 
This contextual source of power is particularly salient in the third of the 
processes mentioned above, namely the management of differences of opinion 
within a constituency. Whatever the state of the labour market, or of the company’s 
order book, some constituents will want their negotiators to accept the other party’s 
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position, others will want to hold out for more. These differences will be occurring 
both within the union membership and within the management team, though the 
former are often more difficult to manage. Constituents who give their negotiators a 
clear strong mandate are likely to get a better outcome though they do also increase 
the risk of their being a deadlock (Friedland, 1983; Klimoski & Ash, 1974). 
One common feature of workplace negotiations is the process whereby the 
union negotiators put their negotiated settlement to the membership for approval. A 
rejection of a proposed settlement completely changes the dynamic of the 
negotiation. Even a credible threat of an adverse vote is a way of exercising of power 
at the bargaining table. In view of this some legislative frameworks prescribe how 
these votes are to occur and in doing so can impact upon the dynamics of the 
negotiation process. 
This brief examination of the established research into how negotiation ‘works’ 
reveals the complexity of the process of reaching agreement. Closer examination of 
the way negotiations occur shows even more complexity. Negotiations typically 
involve a mix of competitive and cooperative behaviour (Putnam, 1990), and the 
success of a negotiation is contingent upon the negotiators’ ability to properly 
manage these complex interactions across the table (Fells, 2012; Olekalns and 
Weingart, 2008). Indeed, during the course of a negotiation there may critical 
incidents that can change the dynamics of the negotiations (Putnam 2004; Druckman 
and Olekalns, 2013). These critical incidents may be sparked by external events, 
including the way the media handle the reporting of a dispute (Putnam and Fuller, 
2014). The way that any such critical incidents are handled can impact not only the 
current negotiation but the ongoing relationship between the parties. 
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Fragility and stability in negotiation relationships 
The focus of this paper is the nature of nature of bargaining in the workplace and in 
particular the impact of the negotiation process on the durability of workplace 
bargaining relationships and structures. As indicated above, the strategic negotiation 
framework of Walton et al (1994) provides a starting point through their identification 
of the parties’ strategic motivations, the processes and structures. Within this 
framework we can introduce some of the more behavioural findings from the 
negotiation research literature that have been presented above. We suggest a 
framework (Table 1) that proposes how strategic, behavioural and structural 
elements of negotiation might characterise fragile and stable workplace relationships. 
In doing so we add the dimension of durability to Walton et al’s (1994) notion of the 
social contract. The six elements of negotiation that are presented in Table 1 provide 
a framework for the analysis of the two negotiation case studies. In particular we will 
explore the two research questions. First, where do negotiation processes in the 
Australian and the Danish case converge/divert? Second, how do the processes of (i) 
goal attainment, (ii) power distribution and (iii) interpersonal dynamics contribute to 
the reproduction of local partnerships? 
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Characteristics of fragility Elements of 
negotiation 
Characteristics of stability 
Incompatible goals 
Perceive own goals can only be achieved 
through the other party making 
concessions 
Goal alignment Some congruent goals 
Perceive that own goals can be achieved 
through the other party achieving its goals 
Strategies based on the (implied or actual) 
use of power 
Power distribution Power may shape the parties’ outcome 
expectations but is not exercised during 
the negotiation 
Infrequent and formal interactions 
Calculus based trust 
Interpersonal 
dynamics: trust 
Frequent interaction resulting in some 
occasions of identification based trust 
Limited 
Used strategically 
Interpersonal 
dynamics: information 
exchange 
Open 
 
Formal  
Negotiators as delegates 
Negotiation structures Formal and informal 
Negotiators with bargaining authority  
Exploited by one or both parties Critical incidents Treated as an opportunity to build 
mutuality 
Table 1: Fragility and stability in negotiation settings 
 
Methods  
Our analysis is based on two in-depth case studies on local negotiation processes of 
pay in a Danish and an Australian manufacturing company, respectively. The design 
of our empirical study is inspired by the process tracing methodology, which 
combines with-in case analysis and controlled comparison (George & Bennett 2005). 
Process tracing (PT) is a method that focuses on the causal sequences linking 
preconditions (X) with outcomes (Y) and seeks to draw attention to the events in 
between (Tansey 2007; Collier 2011). It is often applied to situations, where a 
correlation between X and Y has been identified, but knowledge is limited on the 
potential causal mechanisms linking the two (Beach & Pedersen 2013). In our case, 
we seek to explore the processes that reproduce partnership bargaining relations 
during negotiations in Danish and Australian companies. What contributes to a 
reproduction? Which differences and similarities can be observed? 
It has been argued that bargaining relations varies according to the different 
institutional set-up of labour market regulation in different countries. To isolate the 
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potential effect of this difference on the reproduction of bargaining relations we will 
conduct a controlled comparison of two similar companies in two countries with very 
different systems of labor market regulation. Wage setting in Danish manufacturing 
mainly takes place at company level under the framework of a sector-level 
agreement, whereas wage setting in Australian manufacturing mostly is subject to 
so-called enterprise bargaining regulated by legislation. Do we despite these 
differences observe similarities in the causal sequences across the case companies? 
Or do we mostly observe differences? The comparison allows us to discuss 
variations in elements and strategies. The main selection criteria for the case 
companies are high levels of trust between the local bargaining parties and long 
records of mutual gains bargaining outcomes. Furthermore, cases are selected 
among medium-sized manufacturing companies with a skilled workforce and a high 
union density to keep the set up at local level as similar as possible.  
Each case study includes investigations before, during and after the negotiation 
process. Information was gathered in three ways: 1. Through document studies on 
the region, the company, the union, the employees and agreements. This was used 
as background information. 2. Through company visits and observation of negotiation 
meetings and 3. Through interviews with the chief negotiator on the management 
side and on the union side (Tansey 2007). A total of 8 and 6 interviews were 
conducted in the Danish and the Australian case, respectively. Interview guides 
included questions on the number of contacts with the other bargaining party, 
pauses, the quality of the contacts (formal/informal), trust, information sharing, topics 
discussed, events, contacts to constituencies, current audiences (top management, 
workers, unions, community, public sphere etc.) and the quality of negotiations 
(integrative/distributive). All interviews were transcribed, coded and analysed 
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according to the following strategy of analysis. First we drew a timeline and identified 
phases in the bargaining process of each company. Second, we identified events 
that affected the relations between the bargaining parties (causes, strategies, 
results). Third, we compared citations from the chief negotiator on the manager and 
the union side, respectively, to verify findings and wrote a case description for each 
case. Finally, we compared findings across the Danish and the Australian case.   
 
Case studies in Denmark and Australia 
The Oz Manufacturing Company (Ozco) 2014 Enterprise Bargaining negotiations 
Ozco is an Australian-based producer of high-end industrial machinery with 
subsidiaries in Asia, Europe, the US, and South America. Most of the company’s 
products are made in Australia for export markets. Globally, Ozco has about 800 
employees, with about 110 shopfloor workers at its Australian headquarters. The first 
enterprise agreement between the union and the company was negotiated in 2003 
with the union on strike for two days to secure its key claims. All subsequent 
agreements were negotiated without recourse to industrial action. The core of the 
union’s negotiating team has remained unchanged, principally comprising the union 
official who first organised the company, and a long-standing delegate. According to 
the delegate, union density amongst the approximately 110 shop floor workers was 
relatively high at between 75 % and 80%. There have been several changes in key 
management personnel; the current HR manager has been in the role since early 
2013 and was therefore not involved in the negotiations for the last enterprise 
agreement (2011). He has extensive experience in industrial relations, including 
enterprise bargaining, across different unionised companies. For the 2014 bargaining 
round, the company was represented by the production manager (also part of the 
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negotiation team for the 2011 agreement) and the Assistant HR manager, a novice to 
enterprise bargaining.  
 
Preparation for the negotiations 
The union’s expectations for the 2014 negotiations were, broadly, to secure 
incremental improvements to the existing agreement [Delegate Interview 1, p.28]. 
This was consistent with previous negotiations, where the union and the company 
would essentially ‘roll over’ the last agreement with a schedule of new wage levels, 
making only minor changes and additions to existing terms and conditions. However, 
the HR manager indicated that the company would not simply be rolling over the last 
agreement and that the union might be surprised by this [HR, Interview 1, p.32]. 
Instead, the negotiations were an opportunity to address perceived strategic 
challenges, particularly ‘the ability to adapt and be flexible to the needs of the 
business’ [HR, Interview 1, p.18].  
Both parties recognized that negotiations would be occurring against the 
backdrop of a difficult environment for Australian manufacturing. In particular, a 
number of multi-national corporations (e.g. Toyota) had recently announced the 
closure of their Australian operations, resulting in significant job losses in the 
industry. While the company manufactured the vast majority of its products in 
Australia, it also operated a manufacturing facility in Thailand. The delegate did not 
expect the company’s Thai operation to be a factor in the negotiations, but the HR 
manager was more equivocal in his assessment, in that the ability to build in Thailand 
was “certainly a sort of elephant in the room” [HR, Interview 1, p.36]. 
While the union had high membership density at the company, unions don’t 
enjoy exclusive representation rights under Australian law. As in 2011, a number of 
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non-union employees also participated in the negotiations. The delegate suggested 
that management had encouraged this in an attempt to destabilize the union 
[Delegate, Interview 1, p.7].  
 
The negotiations  
From the outset it looked like the negotiations would be difficult. When the union 
presented its log of claims to the company at the first meeting, it was told by the 
management negotiators that the two parties were “far apart” [Delegate interview 1, 
p.16]. Just how different the parties’ positions were became evident when the 
company issued its claims at the subsequent meeting. The company’s fundamental 
demand was for the new agreement to be ‘cost-neutral’, meaning that any wage 
increases would need to be offset by savings from changes to other conditions in the 
current agreement. Far from being willing to ‘roll over’ the existing agreement, the 
company was effectively seeking cuts to existing employee conditions through the 
reduction or removal of entitlements such as redundancy payments and income 
protection insurance. Further, greater flexibility was to be attained through the 
introduction of hours banking and greater scope to use casual and fixed-term labour.  
Given the gulf between the parties’ positions, there was very little progress 
through meetings in June on reconciling competing demands. The union official also 
attributed this lack of progress to the relatively ‘junior’ status of the management 
team [Union interview 1, p.2]. Indeed, the HR manager explained that he had actively 
discouraged the direct involvement of the owners as well as senior management in 
the negotiations to prevent sudden and / or unilateral changes to the company’s 
bargaining strategy [HR Manager, Interview 3, p.11]. 
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Meanwhile, the company made presentations directly to its employees, outlining 
its demands and reporting aspects of the company’s recent performance. A 
prominent theme was that the union’s current demands threatened the financial 
viability of the Australian operation. Similarly, the union kept members informed 
about the state of negotiations in mass meetings.  
In early July, the company held further presentations to outline different ‘EBA 
options’ for employees to consider. Each of the six options represented a different 
combination of the key conditions under negotiation, each designed to meet the 
company’s goal of a ‘cost-neutral’ agreement. For example, ‘option one’ offered a 
wage increase of 3.75 %, but removed or reduced some major existing entitlements. 
By contrast, ‘option two’ retained these entitlements, but offered no wage increase. 
Interestingly, during earlier negotiation meetings the union had been presented with 
only four EBA options.  
With the parties effectively deadlocked, the union held meetings of members on 
July 8th to recommend there be a formal ballot on industrial action. The result being a 
vote in favour, the dispute looked likely to escalate. However when the parties met 
again briefly the following day the company’s position was unchanged. According to 
the HR manager, the company had developed contingency plans to deal with the 
possibility of industrial action including briefing non-union employees about their right 
to keep working during a strike, liaising with security firms to ensure the continuity of 
operations, asking supervisors to refresh their hands-on manufacturing skills, and 
further training for employees at its Thailand plant.  
Indeed, management responded to the prospect of industrial action by raising 
the stakes, informing the workforce that some of the work performed in Australia 
would now be shifted to Thailand. In these meetings, held while the delegate was off 
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work on sick leave, the company advised workers that a vote in favour of industrial 
action in the upcoming formal ballot would result in work being sent offshore: “…while 
I was away they thought they’d get into the workers and put the fear of God into 
them. Well, and it basically worked.” [Delegate interview 2, p.2]  
By the time of the formal ballot on July 23rd, only about 60 % of union members 
voted in favour industrial action. This relatively low level of support meant the union 
was unlikely to proceed with a strike or similar tactics, leaving it in a significantly 
weakened bargaining position: “…the main thing was, and we explained it to them 
[the members], was that the stronger we are the more bargaining power we’ve got 
when we go up to management. So if they see that we’re weakening, well they’ll 
come and jump on us. And that’s what happened.” [Delegate interview 2, p.8].  
The union then held mass meetings to discuss whether to take industrial action 
or keep negotiating. In a significant tactical and symbolic move, the company did not 
allow these meeting to be held during working hours or on company premises. With 
only limited support for industrial action, it was decided to continue negotiations on 
the basis of a reworked version of one of the company’s EBA options. However, at 
the next negotiation meeting the company adopted a very firm position, advising the 
union that it would be moving offshore within 6 months unless its key demands were 
met. When the union held mass meetings on August 6th to discuss its options there 
was still little appetite to escalate the dispute through industrial action, and members 
decided to accept the company’s basic offer. In subsequent negotiation sessions the 
exact details of the agreement based on the company’s key demands were worked 
out, with the workers ultimately voting to accept the proposed agreement on August 
25th. 
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Wage negotiations 2014 at DK Productions 
DK Productions is a high-tech manufacturing company with a stable demand. It is 
owned by a foreign company, which own several production companies in Denmark. 
The company is divided into a number of independent production units at the same 
address and employs approximately 700 employees - of which about  150 are 
production workers paid by the hour. The production workers are fully organized and 
represented by shop stewards (on-site union representatives) and a local union club 
at the company. They are also represented in the local works council, the health and 
safety committee, the European works council and on the company board. The 
company is covered by the sector-level agreement in Danish industry negotiated by 
The Confederation of Danish Industry and The Central Organisation of Industrial 
Employees in Denmark.  
Management and shop stewards have negotiated many local agreements on 
everything from flextime to fringe benefits. Negotiations on wages for the productions 
workers are conducted once a year during spring. The production manager for the 
largest production unit and the HR-managers represent the management side in 
negotiations. The production manager has been with the company for two years, but 
has 25 years of management experience and 20 years of negotiating experience 
from other companies.  
The shop steward representing the largest group of workers in production leads 
negotiations on the side of the workers with assistance from other shop stewards. He 
has worked at the company for many years and has been a shop steward for 2 
years. During the last two years, managers and shop stewards have conducted two 
wage bargaining rounds and negotiated two layoffs. Both wage bargaining rounds 
were long processes characterized by a confrontational bargaining relationship.  
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Wage bargaining last year ended with a wildcat strike and zero wage increases. 
Management and shop stewards could not agree on wage increases for the minority 
of workers on site who are unskilled. Management perceived wage levels for this 
group of workers as too high, which should be reflected in the wage increases.   They 
would rather increase wages for skilled workers more to make it easier to recruit and 
retain specialists in the company. Five negotiators representing management and 
three negotiators representing workers discussed this during six formal negotiation 
sessions without results. 
Since the zero result last year management and shops stewards have taken 
several initiatives to improve relations between industry and labour at the company. 
They have introduced a monthly meeting between production managers, HR-
managers and shop stewards to coordinate across production units. Shop stewards 
meet every two weeks with local production managers in each workshop, and the 
board of the local union club meets every week. 
 
Preparations for the negotiations 
As a preparation for the next negotiation process management and shop stewards 
made an informal agreement on a three-day stay at a hotel in January to discuss the 
form and content of next year's wage bargaining. Shop stewards also presented 
management with an idea for a principle of wage distributions between skilled and 
unskilled workers that they had agreed on in the local union club. In January, 
however, cut backs in DK Productions  forced management and shop stewards to 
negotiate  a reduction in the number of workers. They managed to find a solution that 
avoided actual layoffs. Hence, the situation made both sides of the table replace the 
planned three-day stay at a hotel with a one-day meeting at the local union. 
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At this meeting they continued their talk about a principle of wage distributions 
between skilled and unskilled workers. Later in January, the HR-manager contacts 
the leading shop steward to discuss an idea for a structure for the upcoming wage 
negotiations (a  48 hour session). The shop stewards begin to prepare for the 
upcoming wage negotiations and collect data on wages via shop steward networks 
and colleagues in other production units of the company in Denmark. In mid-March, 
the local union club organizes an extraordinary meeting on wage negotiations, where 
about 80 percent of the production workers attend. Two days later, management and 
shop stewards hold a formal meeting, where the structure and focus for the 
upcoming negotiations is finalized. They agree to do a concentrated 2-day 
negotiation session at a hotel in early April with an exclusive focus on wage 
increases. The bargaining team on the management side is reduced to three 
participants (1 production manager, 1 HR manager, 1 rapporteur from HR) – on the 
shop steward side three negotiators will participate like last year. In mid-March 
management participate at a conference in DI on wage bargaining 2014 and they 
collect wage information from other companies in manager networks. Afterwards, 
management analyzes the background data and builds up their arguments. In the 
week just before the negotiations management finalizes their strategy for the 
negotiations. Just before the wage negotiations the chief negotiator among the shop 
stewards addresses the production manager for an informal talk about an idea to 
reserve a smaller wage sum for events in the local union club. 
 
The negotiations  
Wage negotiations are conducted and completed as scheduled over two days in 
April. In the beginning of the negotiations the bargaining parties write down an 
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agreement that the summaries of negotiations are not legally binding. This 
agreement is made to ensure an open dialogue at the bargaining table. Then the 
bargaining parties agree on an outline of the negotiations process. First, they will 
reach agreement on wages for skilled workers, and second, they will negotiate 
wages for unskilled workers. The first morning begins with preliminary discussions. In 
the afternoon they present and discuss general and specific figures and the lack of 
wage increases last year. During the afternoon they agree on making the wage 
agreement a two-year agreement, which means they do not need to negotiate next 
year.  In the evening, about 10 PM, they are able to write the first concrete figures on 
wages for the skilled workers to record. The next morning they reach agreement on 
the wage increases for the skilled workers. Drawing on the idea of a principle of wage 
distribution between skilled and unskilled workers, the bargaining parties quickly get 
the wages for the unskilled workers in place after lunch. In the afternoon they include 
a number of small adjustments to the agreement - including reserving a small part of 
the wage sum for events in the local union club - before it is concluded. During the 
negotiation process management take a number of time-outs to calculate on the 
proposals and discuss them internally on the management side, while shop stewards 
take the initiative to one timeout to discuss figures internally. The production 
manager is also in contact with the CEO to discuss the bargaining mandate and in 
contact with DI to get a legal advice during the negotiations. 
A week after the negotiation session there is an informal meeting between the 
leading shop steward and the production manager and two HR managers on how to 
calculate the agreed wage increase (as a percentage of the individual wages or of 
the total wage sum). Two other shop stewards and the CEO participate in the 
meeting over the phone. They agree to calculate percentages of the individual 
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wages. The next day the workers vote yes to the agreement and the day after the 
agreement is signed by management and shop stewards. 
 
Comparative analysis: The impact of negotiation processes on the durability of 
workplace bargaining relationships 
The two negotiation processes followed very different paths to reach agreement, one 
a formal competitive negotiation (Ozco), the other a collaborative and focused 
process (DK Productions). Despite these differences, the framework that was 
presented earlier in the paper (Table 1) proved sufficient for a robust comparative 
analysis to be undertaken. The main findings are presented in Table 2 and a number 
of significant conclusions can be reached. 
First there always will be differences between the substantive goals of the 
parties. The notion of goal alignment relates instead relates to the parties’ 
expectations as to how their differences will be resolved. At DK Productions the 
parties gave considerable thought to how they might negotiate more effectively than 
before; in contrast the negotiators at Ozco did not discuss their forthcoming 
negotiations in any depth.  A related feature of DK Productions negotiations is that 
the major issue in dispute (wage differentials) had been well known for some time 
giving the parties opportunity to separately address the problem in anticipation the 
negotiations. At Ozco, the management approach and negotiation goals were new to 
the table and took the union negotiators by surprise.  
The Ozco negotiations followed a typical competitive format through claim and 
offer, management not appearing to give support to the representational bargaining 
process and both parties using threats or other power tactics. The intensive format of 
the DK Productions negotiations, held at a separate location, both enabled and 
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required the negotiators to engage fully with the task of finding solutions. It is not 
possible to draw any conclusions about what would have happened at DK 
Productions if management’s agenda had been similar to Ozco’s, to achieve 
organisational change efficiencies. It is possible that management having a broader 
change agenda might have put too much strain on the collaborative intent of the 
parties, but less so had the agenda been foreshadowed to give the parties 
opportunity to work on the issues, as occurred at DK Productions. 
The experience of the two case studies suggest that the foundation for genuine 
collaborative negotiation is laid (or not) well before the negotiations start. In this 
respect, the frequent occurrence of negotiation in the Danish system appears more 
conducive, as an enabling context, to the emergence of collaborative negotiation 
than the episodic pattern of enterprise negotiation that occurs in the Australian 
system. Frequent interaction between the negotiators builds working relationships 
and trust that carry over into major negotiations where the tensions might otherwise 
be higher. This is consistent with the comparison under another negotiation heading, 
namely the structures of negotiations. The potential advantages of there being a 
single union at the negotiating table may not be realised if the parties don’t 
maintaining working relationships between their major negotiations. 
Embedded throughout the two negotiations were the parties’ attitudes to how 
information can be used. Without any insightful information on the negotiation table, 
the parties are left only with competitive strategies, as at Ozco; information is then 
used as a weapon, reinforcing the competitive dynamic. 
The two cases provided instructive insights into the impact of critical incidents 
on the negotiation. In the Ozco negotiations the union negotiators’ gradual realisation 
that management was taking an unexpected hard line was one turning point; 
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management’s subsequent actions simply reinforced the union negotiators’ new 
perspective. DK Productions’ management also had to deal with a critical incident, 
namely the need to reduce employee numbers. Such a situation could easily ‘set the 
tone’ for the ensuing negotiations but it did not; rather the way it was handled 
reinforced the collaborative commitment of the parties. 
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Elements of 
negotiation 
Oz Manufacturing Co DK Productions  
Goals 
- for the negotiation 
- for the relationship 
Negotiation goals 
Union – incremental improvement in 
terms & conditions 
Company – organisational change 
efficiencies 
Relationship goals 
Union – maintain collaboration with 
company 
Company – to contain or reduce union 
influence  
Negotiation goals 
Union – to maintain existing skilled-
unskilled differentials 
Company – to increase the skill 
differential   
The implied goal for both was ‘resolve 
the wages issue without disputation’ 
Relationship goals 
The approach taken in this negotiation 
was consistent with both parties wanting 
to maintain a longer term collaborative 
relationship 
Power distribution 
- indicators 
Traditional claim-based approach 
- union‘s initial claim 
- membership mandate 
- management’s counter offer 
Limited process support from 
management  
- no time off for union meetings etc 
- delegated lower ranked HR to negotiate 
Management utilised threat to relocate 
Union invoked strike ballot process (but 
low response) 
No obvious exercise of power-based 
strategies though the fact that they took 
two full days to negotiate would suggest 
robust bargaining over the wage issue 
Interpersonal 
dynamics 
- trust 
 
Regular EB negotiations since 2003; a 
short dispute then but not since 
Company recognised as innovative, 
collaborative 
Stable union team; perceived a good 
ongoing relationship with the owners 
New HR manager 
Company communicated directly with 
employees; undermining union 
negotiators’ position 
No obvious indications of mutual trust; 
(reliance on formal meetings; 
management’s reluctance to share 
information) 
The company made multiple offers, 
which is a recommended integrative 
approach but did so in a competitive 
context eg more to the workforce than at 
the negotiation table 
Informal talks about future round of 
negotiations (bargaining over how to 
bargain) 
Agreed format of 2 days intensive 
negotiations 
Single issue - wages 
During the negotiations, negotiators 
maintain contact with respective 
constituents 
 
High level of informal contact between 
management and union negotiators 
 
 
Subsequent informal negotiations to 
resolve consequential issues 
Interpersonal 
dynamics 
- Information 
exchange 
Company reluctant to provide union with 
information that was previously provided 
directly to employees; delayed in giving 
financial information that was part of the 
agreement  
Both parties engage in extensive 
research (wage data etc). Information 
exchanged at the bargaining table in the 
beginning of negotiations. 
 
Negotiation 
structures 
 
Relatively high union density 
Single union 
A consultative committee but not relied 
upon 
Unorganised workers participate in 
negotiations 
Management organizes mass meetings 
without union presence 
High union density but historical 
divisions between skilled and unskilled 
Two unions, one chief negotiator (local 
shop steward) 
High level of informal contact between 
management and union negotiators 
Critical incidents 
- internal or external 
Change in management 
Management’s unanticipated hard line 
approach 
Announcement of major job losses in 
Victoria  
Change in management 
Previous round of negotiations that 
involved industrial action and no wage 
outcome 
Potential lay off at local site 
Table 2: Elements of the negotiation processes in the two case studies 
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The strategic negotiation framework (Walton et al, 1994) suggests three 
management strategies: forcing, fostering or escape (from a union relationship 
altogether). From the way they approached the task of negotiating a new enterprise 
agreement management at Ozco look to be ‘forcing’ rather than ‘fostering change. 
While not overtly seeking to ‘escape’ from a negotiation relationship with the union 
the indications are that management would go down that route if the union allowed it. 
The stability of the relationship is dependent to a large part on the union’s ability to 
mobilise membership strength and draw upon whatever support it can from the 
legislative framework to force management to the negotiating table. Even then, from 
the evidence of this negotiation, there is no indication that management would adopt 
a fostering approach in anticipation of setting up an interest-based bargaining 
process for the next round of enterprise negotiations  
At DK Productions, management’s approach appears to be ‘fostering’ and this 
approach is reciprocated by the union. Given this congruence, we would expect the 
bargaining relationship to be stable. However, this does not imply that they will 
necessarily negotiate in this intensive format next time. The key lesson appears to be 
an ongoing level of investment by the parties – frequent interaction between the 
negotiators leading to an increase in trust and to a more open use of information. The 
stability of this ongoing mutuality is evidenced by the strike that occurred in the 
previous negotiation round not becoming a critical incident that underpinned the 
current round of negotiations. 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
The reproduction of local partnerships includes elements of integrative bargaining, 
distributive bargaining and conflict at both the Danish and the Australian case 
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company. In this perspective, both cases indicate that stability does not mean lack of 
change but rather the ability to reproduce partnerships over time, whereas fragility is 
related to a lack of that ability. This is a dynamic perception of stability. However, 
significant differences in the negotiation processes between the Danish and the 
Australian case suggest that reproduction can follow different paths in the two 
countries. 
In the Danish case the goal alignment process is spread out over the entire 
year, whereas this mainly takes place at negotiation meetings in the Australian case. 
Perhaps this is enabled by the fact that the local shop steward (who are on-site 
always) conducts the bargaining in the Danish case, whereas it is conducted by the 
representative from the local union office in the Australian case. The longer goal 
alignment process in the Danish case makes it possible to use the goal alignment to 
reproduce (or repair!) trust-based bargaining relations. 
Despite high union densities in both cases, significant differences in the power 
distribution can be observed. Australian legislation enables unorganised workers to 
participate in negotiation meetings in the Australian case. Furthermore, management 
can arrange mass meetings with workers without union presence. This potentially 
undermines union power in a way that is not observed in the Danish case.  
In both cases change on the management side potentially threatens the 
bargaining relations. However, it seems possible to build trust with new managers, 
especially since the union representatives have a high (long?) tenure. Perhaps this 
process of trust creation is somewhat easier for the Danish shop steward, who is 
always on-site and meets management on a daily informal basis, than the Australian 
union official, who works from the local union office and less frequently meets up with 
new managers. 
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Stable partnerships in both cases seem to be a dynamic phenomenon that rely 
heavily on the ability to reproduce partnerships. However, Danish labour market 
regulation with regards to decentralized bargaining and the local institutional set-up 
seem to offer better support for local reproduction processes than the Australian 
framework. In particular, the capacity for workers to veto decentralized agreements 
and revert back to the industry agreement would appear to provide a safeguard 
against managerial attempts at ‘forcing’. By contrast, aspects of Australia’s 
bargaining framework (e.g. scope for non-union bargaining representatives, 
elaborate procedural requirements around industrial action) would appear to 
strengthen management’s capacity to influence employee sentiment in line with 
corporate interests. This can be observed in processes of goal alignment, power 
distribution and interpersonal dynamics. However, both the Australian and the Danish 
framework for decentralised bargaining face similar challenging developments of 
dropping union densities and/or fewer shop stewards. This means that the 
reproduction of partnerships in an increasing number of companies take place under 
fragile rather than stable conditions.  
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